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Abstract
As nations engage in the long-term process of negotiating a protocol on controlling greenhouse gas
emissions, the danger of costly mistakes looms large, both from doing too little or too much. Researchers
try to provide insight and guidance on this difficult problem, many relying on the tools of mathematical
simulation models, but two important shortcomings remain in much of the current analysis. One is the
treatment of the uncertainty inherent in projections of economic activity over the next century or more; and
the other is the way economic activity is modeled to impact the poorly understood physical and biological
systems of the earth.
This paper presents several simple illustrations of the performance of current policy proposals in the
face of a long-term climate-based goal when uncertainties in economic growth and technology development
are made explicit. Several conclusions emerge. Analyses that rely on deterministic emissions paths through
time obscure the underlying uncertainties, and explicitly incorporating these uncertainties can produce
qualitatively different conclusions. Moreover, apparent differences in the climate impacts of proposals now
being debated within the Framework Convention on Climate Change may be negligible when viewed in the
light of likely uncertainties. Seeking a less stringent protocol with a higher probability of compliance may
thus produce preferable outcomes. Most importantly, the analyses presented are meant to highlight the need
for flexibility in any response to climate change, because uncertainty is an unavoidable aspect of the
problem.
1. Introduction
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) are engaged
in an arduous series of negotiations on a possible greenhouse gas reduction protocol. These
discussions are carried out under the auspices of the Ad-Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate
(AGBM), which was formed in the aftermath of the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties
(COP-1) in Berlin in April, 1995 (United Nations, 1995). A major focus of the AGBM is the
specific form of “targets and timetables” (Quantified Emissions Limitation and Reduction
Objectives (QELROs) in the language of the Climate Convention) for the so-called Annex I
parties.1 If agreed, these would be legally binding restrictions on those countries that sign on to a
protocol, restricting their emissions of greenhouse gases according to a particular schedule.
Throughout this process, the negotiators and their respective governments have received
volumes of technical advice from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the
Subsidiary Body on Science and Technology Assessment (SBSTA). These contributions have
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 Annex I consists of the industrialized world: the member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) at the time of the signing of the FCCC in 1992, the states of Eastern and Central Europe
and the European states of the former Soviet Union. Some recent proposals suggest adding those countries that
have recently joined the OECD, including Mexico and the Republic of Korea (e.g., the EU proposal in AGBM,
1997b).
2played a valuable role in informing and even guiding the decisions taken by policy-makers.
However, our analysis casts a critical eye on a crucial element of the information being provided to
that process, namely the incorporation of uncertainty into the analysis of alternative emissions
limitation proposals.
Any evaluation of alternative policy responses begins with an attempt to understand what may
occur in the absence of action and then estimates the consequences of possible policies. Given the
long time scales involved and the interactions between economic and climate systems, efforts to
predict the magnitude of future climate change must necessarily rely heavily upon computer-based
mathematical modeling. Many of the parameter values used in these models are known only
imprecisely, or may be the subject of a contentious debate among experts. The most common
approach to account for such uncertainties is to develop scenarios by using alternative sets of input
assumptions. These scenarios are then used to create forecasts of emissions by inserting the
specified input assumptions into the economic models. The discrete projections that are produced
drive models of climate, which are in turn subject to additional uncertainties in climate
parameterization. The resulting climate changes from different scenarios can then be used to
describe the possible impacts of each trajectory.
Any policy designed to achieve a climate objective should, at least, be able to assess the
likelihood that it will attain that goal. By neglecting uncertainty and focusing solely on scenario
analysis, however, policy modeling efforts are missing crucial insights that could inform decision-
makers. Uncertainty is endemic to climate change, and the resulting outcomes under any policy
regime are inherently stochastic. Only by directly incorporating uncertainty into the consideration
and evaluation of alternative policy measures can the true nature of the difficult decisions begin to
emerge: trading off uncertain costs against the risks from an uncertain climate.
To date, the focus on scenarios in the analysis of climate change policy has been ubiquitous.
The most widely used set of scenarios consists of emissions trajectories developed by the IPCC
(1992). The IPCC developed six possible alternative “emission paths” labeled IS92a – IS92f, each
based on different assumptions about population growth, economic growth, energy supply, and
other factors affecting greenhouse gas emissions. The IS92 emissions paths have provided a
reference for other model-based analyses, both as inputs into climate models and as the basis for
comparison with projections by economic-energy models. In particular, IS92a, being the central
case, is commonly used as a reference for modeling studies. For example, the Energy Modeling
Forum (EMF) based at Stanford University is coordinating an international effort to compare
integrated assessment models for climate change, and has used the IS92a trajectory as the basis for
its reference scenario (EMF, 1995). Climate modeling studies, most of which are conducted
independently of economic analysis, use these standard emissions paths (again, primarily IS92a)
as inputs, both for consistency and simplicity.
Emissions scenarios, such as the IS92 paths, are used not only for predicting radiative forcing
with “existing policies” but also to establish a counterfactual for examining the climate implications
of alternative control proposals. While the current round of negotiations has focused on targets in
the near to intermediate term (2005 to 2020), the overall objective of the FCCC is “to achieve…
3stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations, 1992). This
phrasing begs two as yet unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) questions: (1) what level of
damage constitutes “dangerous interference,” and, even if such a question could be answered,
(2) what is the level of concentrations at which we should stabilize that would avoid such
damages? In support of modeling work to address this question, the IPCC has developed a set of
emissions trajectories that would stabilize CO2 concentrations by the year 2400 at 350 ppm (parts
per million), 450 ppm, 550 ppm, 650 ppm, 750 ppm, and 1000 ppm (IPCC, 1996).2 Since carbon
dioxide has a relatively long atmospheric lifetime, stabilization can only be achieved if total
emissions begin to decline long before the concentration target has been reached. Since most
models predict substantial continued growth in global emissions, the more stringent concentration
targets would require drastic reductions in CO2 emissions.
In an influential paper, Wigley, Richels, and Edmonds (1996) responded to the publication of
the IPCC paths by demonstrating that different emissions paths can achieve essentially the same
stabilization target while having dramatically different costs. Their argument made clear that the
choice of the time-path of emissions must be a part of the policy design, in addition to the eventual
concentration target.3 Other recent analyses have attempted to break from the framework of
choosing among distinct emissions paths through time, by instead seeking upper and lower limits
on emissions trajectories that satisfy prescribed constraints. Such analyses include the work on
“safe corridors” by Alcamo and Kreileman (1996) and on “tolerable windows” by Toth et al.
(1997). Both studies seek a range of emission paths through time that meet both long-term
objectives, such as the eventual temperature change, and place limits on the rate of change of
objective measures such as temperature, sea level, and economic costs.
Several previous studies have attempted to address uncertainty more directly. Examples include
the demonstration of the probability distributions of emissions under no policy (Manne and
Richels, 1994), or the distributions of costs under different carbon taxes (Morgan and
Dowlatabadi, 1996). Other approaches include the calculation of the value of information by
Nordhaus and Popp (1997), who assume probabilities for discrete scenarios and eliminate
uncertainty in different time periods. Finally, the most explicit use of uncertainty analysis to
provide insight for the current climate policy choices is by Pizer (1997), who examines the change
in optimal carbon taxes under uncertainty and the implications of those results for the choice
between taxes and tradable emissions permits.
This paper expands beyond these previous approaches to uncertainty analysis, by explicitly
relating uncertainty in economic and technological change to the implications for climate of
emissions protocols currently being debated by governments. Uncertainty in its various forms is
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 For comparison, the concentration of CO2 was approximately 280 ppm in 1800, 315 ppm in 1957, and 358 ppm
in 1994 (IPCC, 1996, p. 76). Unconstrained emissions for the IS92 scenarios produce concentrations in the range
of 500–950 ppm by 2100 (IPCC, 1996, p. 83).
3
 Further implications of choosing between alternative emissions paths to achieve a particular target are explored in
Manne and Richels (1997).
4reviewed in Section 2, distinguishing indeterminate knowledge, which is unquantifiable, from the
relatively narrow types of uncertainty that will be investigated in greater depth in later sections.
Section 3 then demonstrates the probabilistic nature of the impacts on climate of proposed emission
protocols, using several illustrative examples. Once aware that any policy has some probability of
avoiding an undesirable amount of climate change, the next question is what level of risk should be
chosen. Section 4 provides a theoretical discussion of acceptable risk and the role of the
precautionary principle. One serious concern in specifying the stringency of a policy response is
the potential for nations to fail to carry out their obligations under an agreement. As a further
illustration of how uncertainty analysis can be used for policy, a simple treatment of failed
agreements is presented in Section 5. Conclusions and future areas of research are then presented
in Section 6.
2. Uncertainties and Indeterminacies in Economic Models
In the debate over climate change, uncertainties are omnipresent. Estimates of future emissions
of carbon dioxide are highly uncertain. The main drivers of such projections—rates of economic
growth, availability of new energy supply technologies, resource abundance, and energy efficiency
improvements in end-use sectors—are all subject to uncertainty. Differences among the economic
modeling frameworks themselves can also be expected to yield significant differences in
projections. Further, translating these emissions into radiative forcing of climate change, and then
to quantitative impacts on climate is subject to significant uncertainty in the climate models used to
calculate the system response.4
In this paper we sidestep the admittedly important scientific uncertainties in predicting physical
impacts from an increase in CO2 to focus on uncertainty in emissions forecasts. Why is emissions
forecasting so uncertain? Although they require extensive data collection to prepare base year data
and parameter estimates, the models used to project emissions consist of essentially simple
representations of economic activity, coupled with other simple models of energy supply
technology choices and their emissions characteristics. Performing long-term predictions with such
models requires assumptions about future trends that will always be uncertain within a fairly wide
range.
In the absence of compelling reasons to do otherwise, most economic simulations extrapolate
historical values for input variables using simple linear or exponential trends to model future
behavior. Past experience, expert elicitation, or some combination serve as the “reasonable” basis
upon which growth is extrapolated. Such methods, while perhaps the only analytically tractable
choice, cannot capture unanticipated changes in external conditions or rapid changes in the
penetration of new technologies, both of which are likely to arise over the time horizon in question.
The inability to capture such behavior can lead to significant errors in prediction.
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 The impacts on climate might be measured in terms of an increase in mean global surface temperature or degree of
sea-level rise.
5A classic example of erroneous predictions can be found in the forecasts of electricity demand
growth. Figure 1 summarizes the range of projections for summer peak demand for electricity in
the United States as a function of the year in which the prediction took place. Presented in such a
stark manner, the misplaced assumptions in energy modeling are apparent. In particular, these
forecasts reveal two important difficulties in modeling: (1) a reliance on straight-line growth; and
(2) an inability to anticipate the repercussions of exogenous change in demand such as the changes
precipitated by the Oil Crisis of 1973–79, overall macroeconomic performance, changing
demographics, and saturation processes.
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Figure 1. Projections of U.S. electric load growth: Annual 10-year forecasts of summer peak
demand. (Source: OTA, 1985, Figure 3-3)
Another source of the limits of any modeling exercise is the rapid, often unanticipated
penetration of new technologies. Figure 2 presents the shifts in the shares of sectoral production
from different steel manufacturing technologies over the course of a century and a half. As can be
seen, it is quite common for a new technology to leap from minimal penetration in a major
industrial sector to dominance within a decade or two. In turn, each of these technologies has
significantly different implications for energy consumption and emissions.
Unanticipated changes can be grouped into one class of problems for models that might better
be classified as “indeterminacies” (Wynne, 1992). Over the time horizons needed for the study of
climate change, many unforeseeable developments could render any forecast to be biased in some
6yet-to-be-determined direction. Volatility in political and economic conditions and hence in energy
markets also poses a significant threat to the validity of forecasts and is most likely to affect those
regions where the bulk of the growth in emissions is expected to occur.
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Figure 2. Change in process technology used in American steel manufacturing: Fractional shares
of raw steel tonnage produced. (Source: Grübler, 1996, Figure 7)
In the context of climate change, nascent efforts to capture the effects of indeterminacy have
concentrated on the possibilities of “surprise,” such as non-linearities, threshold effects, or
catastrophic impacts in the physical system (Hassol and Katzenberger, 1995; Darmstadter and
Toman, 1993). Much work remains to systematically capture the economic and physical impacts of
even much-discussed catastrophic events such as a collapse of the thermohaline circulation in the
North Atlantic or massive forest dieback (e.g., Manabe and Stouffer, 1994). These phenomena
have received widespread attention and some preliminary analysis, but there is no reason to believe
that all possible positive and negative feedbacks have been anticipated.
While casting a shadow over any forecast, most of these considerations are not easily amenable
to analysis except by using highly speculative “what if” scenarios. Such an exercise requires a
series of scenarios to be developed which, while valuable, are virtually impossible to associate
with a probability and are thus of questionable service to policy-makers. 5 Moreover, completely
unanticipated climatic behavior and physical and socio-economic impacts obviously cannot be
captured by even the most ambitious scenario analysis. Nevertheless, the potential for foreseeable
and unforeseeable catastrophes plays a powerful role in motivating a precautionary principle; the
implication of which will be discussed in Section 4.
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 Kates and Clark (1996) provide a useful overview of attempts to address “surprises” in environmental policy analysis.
But in spite of an optimistic assessment of the prospects of such exercises, they leave little reason to believe that
such surprises could easily be incorporated into an analytical framework that leads to quantitative analysis.
7Model outputs are also subject to a second class of difficulties that arises from the uncertainty
in the values of key parameters that drive these models and that are amenable to analysis.
Uncertainty in model input parameters can be represented by probability distributions, which,
when propagated through a model, produce a distribution of possible future emissions rather than a
single discrete emission path. Previously firm conclusions from deterministic studies may now no
longer hold. The variance in the distribution of emissions will change over time as a function of the
interactions and feedbacks endogenous to the model and of the correlation between the uncertain
drivers (Webster, 1997). As a result, the variance of outputs may be quite different from the input
variances and furthermore, symmetric input distributions can produce asymmetric output
distributions. For example, a uniform distribution in the price of new energy technologies will
produce asymmetric changes in emissions because the higher-priced end of the distribution will
have no effect while changes in price at the lower end will increase market penetration.
While most studies are quite conscientious in acknowledging the uncertainties in their results,
usually only the reference values for the key inputs are used to establish a counterfactual and to
present the effects of a policy. Since there has been little effort to move beyond occasional
sensitivity analyses, what passes for uncertainty analysis is often simply so-called meta-analysis,0
which presents results of different models, each of which is solved at different respective reference
values. A prominent example of such an approach can be found in a recent study at the World
Resources Institute by Repetto and Austin (1997), which attempts to trace the divergence in the
assessment of economic impacts of a climate change protocol by different researchers to
differences in structural assumptions. Structural or model uncertainty, as opposed to parameter
uncertainty, refers to uncertainties over whether to include a particular process (e.g., a production
sector in an economic model) or over what functional form to use for a process.
It must be emphasized that the conclusions drawn by such meta-studies are not being contested.
We readily concede that inter-model differences are significant. Owing to different formulations,
results may differ significantly across models even when considerable effort is made to ensure the
consistency of the input assumptions. Perceiving different models as the means by which
uncertainty can be conveyed, policy-makers and interest groups have focused on differences in
structural assumptions as responsible for differences in results. While no consensus exists on
which model is most appropriate, our study hopes to illustrate, by examining one particular model,
that the uncertainty in assumptions about parameters by itself can have profound implications for
policy.
In particular, we will apply uncertainty analysis to an assessment of the effects on climate of
different carbon abatement protocols. Studies that can relate policy actions to reduced climate
impacts are critical to informing the current negotiations, but are also exceedingly contentious as
witnessed by the recent debate within the Subsidiary Body on Science and Technology Assessment
8(SBSTA) over how such a study should proceed (SBSTA, 1997).6 While many political and
technical disputes simmer at or below the surface of this debate, there has been little effort to
adequately represent economic or scientific uncertainties or to explore what is meant by ‘achieving’
a particular climatic objective.
In light of the enormous uncertainty in emissions forecasts, discussed above, conclusions of
the form: “Stabilizing CO2 emissions at 1990 levels would reduce concentrations by XXX ppm
and temperature change by Y.Y ˚C” would be erroneous and misleading. Given the wide range in
possible emissions under any protocol, the more appropriate question to ask is: “What is the
probability of avoiding some undesirable physical impact or set of impacts by implementing a
given protocol?” Indeed, one of the major criticisms voiced by both Kuwait and Nigeria in their
submissions to SBSTA was that although IS92 emissions paths consist of six scenarios, often
only the most common reference, IS92a, and the two “extreme” paths that bracket the range are
presented. The use of only the extreme scenarios as alternatives to the reference can lead some
policy-makers to “discount either or both of them, because they reflect what some people regard as
‘extreme’ assumptions” (SBSTA, 1997, p. 10). Constrained to debate modeling results that are
based on the IS92a path, OPEC countries would, rightly, need to search out a model that shows
high costs, or the lowest climate impact, to support their negotiating position. In reality, their
position is simply one that is heavily weighted toward cost considerations in the tradeoff between
uncertain costs and the risks of climate change, a position that would be more amenable under the
present framework. Explicitly incorporating uncertainty into model results would not remove all of
the objections to modeling studies but it does provide an opportunity to reduce conflict along
certain dimensions and to clarify the policy questions being debated.
Incorporating uncertainty has the potential to move the political debate away from disputes over
modeling arcana to more central political questions regarding what constitutes sufficient action
toward a pre-determined climate objective. The process of seeking results from different models
often acts as a proxy for differences in preferences for action; the use of probability distributions
allows for those choices to be made more transparent. Arguments over what actions are sufficient
can be located within the presentation of results from a single modeling exercise in a way that
would be impossible using results of deterministic studies. In so doing, differences over the central
tendency of the modeling results and over the types and ranges of uncertainties, which remain
important avenues for future research, might be sheltered from the political debate over what
actions should be taken.7
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 In a similar vein, the Brazilian government has arrived at a concept of “effective emissions,” which explicitly
relates emissions to sea-level rise and temperature change using simple coefficients derived from the IPCC
MAGICC box-diffusion model (AGBM, 1997c). The results of this analysis are an important first step but
provide only a deterministic assessment of climate targets.
7
 Jamieson (1996) takes this argument further, contending that uncertainty is not simply an objective value but one
that is constructed by both science and society to serve a number of functional purposes for both policy-makers
and scientists themselves. In his words, uncertainty can indirectly bring policy debates to closure by reducing
science “to just another playground for competing ideologies.” Scientists, in turn, benefit because “the right
amount of uncertainty supports a call for further research” (p. 40).
93. Achieving a Target under Uncertainty
3.1 Evaluating a Protocol under Certainty
Before investigating the implications for climate of different protocols under uncertainty, we
first perform a typical scenario analysis under certainty. Current QELRO proposals to the AGBM
span a wide range, yet all entail some reduction below 1990 emissions for all Annex I (or OECD)
states (Table 1). It would be useful to know what the differences are between these proposals in
terms of their impact on CO2 concentrations. Higher CO2 concentrations lead to increased radiative
forcing of climate change, and to greater potential impacts of this climate change. For simplicity,
we will first explore the impacts of protocols on CO2 concentrations only.
Table 1. Proposals for an Annex I Emissions Protocol to AGBM
Country Submission Proposed Reduction Below 1990 Levels
AOSIS 20% by 2005
Austria, Germany 10% by 2005 and 15-20% by 2010
Belgium 10-20% by 2010
Denmark 20% by 2005 and 50% by 2030
France 7-10% by 2010
Japan 0-5% by 2012
Netherlands 1-2% per year
Switzerland 10% by 2010
United Kingdom 5-10% by 2010
United States 0% by 2012
Zaire 10% by 2005, 15% by 2010, and 20% by 2020
 Sources: AGBM (1997a), Government of Japan (1997), White House (1997)
In the traditional manner of scenario analysis, two idealized protocols are chosen for analysis
as representing the extremes of the range of QELRO proposals:
• Stabilization—OECD nations stabilize their CO2 emissions at 1990 levels; and
• AOSIS8—OECD nations stabilize emissions at 20% below 1990 levels by 2010.
In both cases, the emissions of all other countries remain unconstrained. For analytical tractability,
both protocols hold OECD emissions to 2010 levels for the remainder of the century.
The traditional method of analyzing these two cases is to use some form of economic-energy
model. First, the model is used to project emissions when there are no constraints on emissions;
this counterfactual is called the reference case or the “no policy” case. Then, emissions constraints
defined by the protocol are imposed, and the model again projects emissions over time. The
resulting trajectories are then used to find corresponding CO2 concentration paths, using a carbon-
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 The actual proposal put forward by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) calls for a 20% cut in all Annex I
states by 2005.
10
cycle model. Finally, the concentrations in each case can be compared with a desired target
concentration to gauge the relative effectiveness of each protocol.
For the sample analysis presented here and throughout this paper, the economic model used is
the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Yang et al., 1996; Jacoby et al.,
1997), which is derived from the OECD’s     Gene  ral    Equilibrium    En  vironmental (GREEN) model
(Burniaux et al., 1992). EPPA is a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium model with
twelve economic-political regions, ten production sectors, and four consumption sectors. The time
horizon for the model simulations is 1990–2100, which EPPA solves for in 5-year time steps.
EPPA is the economic component of the Integrated Global System Model (IGSM), which also
includes a 2D climate-chemistry model, and the Terrestrial Ecosystems Model (TEM) for
measuring impacts on the biosphere (Prinn et al., 1997).
As discussed earlier in a more general context, many assumptions in EPPA are uncertain, such
as economic growth rates, costs of future energy technologies, and rates of energy efficiency
improvement. Scenario analysis, however, requires that we ignore the uncertainty for now and run
the model for each policy case using nominal assumptions. The emissions for the no policy case
reach nearly 20 GtC by 2100, as shown in Figure 3. The stabilization case requires that the four
regions in EPPA that represent the OECD emit no more than their 1990 emissions levels (with no
constraints on the eight other regions), and resulting global emissions only increase to 14.7 GtC by
2100. The AOSIS case requires OECD regions to stabilize at the more stringent level of 20%
below the 1990 levels, and the resulting global emissions are reduced slightly further, rising to less
than 14.1 GtC by 2100.
Figure 4 shows the concentration profiles that correspond to the emissions scenarios in
Figure 3.9 The absence of a protocol would result in the concentration target being exceeded by
100 ppm. The stabilization policy, in contrast, would keep the concentration of CO2 just below 650
ppm. The AOSIS protocol would keep concentrations below the target with an additional margin of
safety of about 20 ppm.
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 In this calculation and throughout this paper we neglect the equally important uncertainties in the climate,
atmospheric chemistry, and carbon-cycle models. Two important assumptions are that the climate sensitivity is
assumed to be 2.5˚C (this is the temperature change that would result from a doubling of the CO2 concentration
after the climate system reaches equilibrium); and that the coefficient of ocean heat uptake in the deep ocean is
assumed to be 2.5 cm2/s (Andrei Sokolov, personal communication, 1997).
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Figure 4. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations paths for different QELROs using reference values for
input parameters in EPPA model.
Although somewhat simplified, the analysis of Figures 3 and 4 is typical of the scenario-based
approach commonly performed to support climate policy. Unfortunately, it can lead to misplaced
conclusions concerning uncertainty.  For instance, given a target of 650 ppm in 2100, one might
conclude that the “no policy” case is entirely inadequate, that stabilization at 1990 levels will just
12
meet the target, and that the AOSIS protocol would provide a desirable margin of safety.  Simply
acknowledging the presence of uncertainty, common in studies of climate change, would seem to
create a strong preference for the more stringent AOSIS policy in order to protect against an
unfavorable resolution of the uncertainty. As will be seen in the remainder of this section, the
results from a more rigorous inclusion of uncertainty in the analysis are not nearly so clear.
3.2 Evaluating Policies under Uncertainty
The EPPA model, as with all models, relies upon assumptions for its many numerical
parameters, despite great uncertainty over what these values should be. What we would like to
know is the effect of these uncertainties on the outcomes of the model, in particular on CO2
emissions. To investigate this question, we can posit probability distributions that represent our
beliefs about possible values for some important parameters, and then find the resulting probability
distributions for emissions. Three important parameters in EPPA that represent uncertain future
trends in economic growth and technology development are:
• Autonomous energy efficiency improvement rate (AEEI);
• Labor productivity growth rate; and
• Price of carbon-free electricity supply alternatives in the future.
We will use the uncertainty in these parameters to explore the climate implications of proposed
emissions reduction protocols.10
The probability distributions for these three parameters were derived from subjective
assessments of several experts, and are represented as Beta distributions.11 Although this exercise
only examines the uncertainty in these parameters, there are other important uncertainties in the
EPPA model that are not accounted for here. Furthermore, it should be stressed that people tend to
underestimate uncertainty when making subjective probability assessments, particularly for long-
range predictions. Thus, the probability distributions of outcomes shown here are likely to
understate the actual uncertainties in these modeling exercises.12
We use these subjective probability distributions of parameters to conduct an uncertainty
analysis of the EPPA model. The analysis utilizes the Deterministic Equivalent Modeling Method
(DEMM), an efficient procedure for propagating uncertainty through models. DEMM finds an
approximation for the response of a model, represented as an expansion of orthogonal polynomials
derived from, and with greatest accuracy near the maxima of, the probability densities of input
parameters (Tatang et al., 1997). This approximation and the uncertainty in the parameters are used
to obtain probability distributions of CO2 emissions in each 5-year period over the interval
1990–2100, as well as the distribution for the cumulative carbon emissions. Concentration targets
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 A detailed exposition of the analytical approach used to address the uncertainty in CO2 emissions can be found in
Webster (1997).
11
 Beta distributions are defined over a finite range.
12
 On the other hand, the correlation between uncertainties can decrease that range of possible outcomes, as
demonstrated in Webster (1997). Nevertheless, our experiments suggest that including other economic
uncertainties would increase the variance more than accounting for correlation decreases the variance.
13
can then be evaluated using these probability distributions in order to determine the probability that
concentrations will remain below the target.
Once we acknowledge that some uncertainty is intrinsic and irreducible, it becomes clear that it
is neither possible nor useful to say whether a policy with a long time frame will or will not achieve
a particular target. A more appropriate view is to consider what probability or likelihood that a
policy proposal has of meeting a goal, such as limiting temperature rise or CO2 concentrations. If a
policy goal is deemed serious enough to warrant action, then it is important to ensure that such
action give a sufficiently high probability of succeeding, so as not to be wasted effort.
For the analysis of policies under uncertainty, we derive an alternative long-term policy goal,
which is related to actual proposals in the FCCC process, in place of the concentration target used
in Figure 4. The AOSIS states and the European Union have both proposed that warming be
limited to 2˚C (EU, 1996; AGBM, 1997d).13 For purposes of this analysis, we will disregard the
difficult question of whether the goal of limiting warming to 2˚C is itself desirable.
Using the MIT 2D-LO climate model (Sokolov and Stone, 1997) we find that a rate of CO2
concentration increase of roughly 0.7% per year would result in a temperature change of
approximately 1.7˚C by 2100.14 This only accounts for CO2 and ignores all other greenhouse
gases; however, since CO2 is responsible for roughly two-thirds of the greenhouse effect
(Houghton, 1994), this is a reasonable first approximation for an overall 2˚C rise in temperature.
Taking this one more step back into the emissions world, a carbon-cycle model (Prinn et al., 1997)
is used to find that a typical emissions path that leads to a 0.7% per year increase in concentrations
has cumulative emissions of about 1400 GtC.
The average residence time in the atmosphere of CO2 is fairly long, as much as 45–120 years
by some estimates (Wigley, 1993).15 Although different emissions paths can exist that result in
roughly the same level of CO2 concentration after 100 years (Wigley et al., 1996), the alternative
emissions paths that give the same concentration tend to have almost the same cumulative carbon
emissions. Thus, we will use cumulative emissions of less than 1400 GtC as a proxy for realizing
a temperature increase of less than 2˚C by 2100. This illustration is only a first step; a more
detailed analysis, which studies the response of carbon-cycle and climate models under
uncertainty, is desirable.
In order to most clearly demonstrate the implications of uncertainty for scenario analysis as
typically performed, we maintain here the common practice of comparing policies as once-and-for-
all decisions. Over a time horizon of 100 years or more, policies should be, and realistically, will
be, revised many times as new information comes to light. Modeling the evolution of climate
                                                
13
 Coincidentally (or perhaps not) this 2˚C warming corresponds roughly to what might result from a doubling of
CO2 concentrations (2 ·  CO2). Doubling of CO2 experiments date back over two decades as a standard benchmark
scenario for comparing climate models, and originally had no relation to impacts of climate change.
14
 Andrei Sokolov, personal communication, 1997.
15
 The results of the MIT model of the oceanic carbon sink (Prinn et al., 1997) suggest a shorter lifetime of 30–60
years, which varies over time with the state of the climate-ocean system (Chien Wang, personal communication,
1997).
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policy as a learning process is better captured by sequential decision-making models, such as those
of Valverde (1997) and Manne and Richels (1992).
Given our proxy goal of limiting global cumulative emissions to 1400 GtC by 2100, we would
like to assess the chances of achieving this goal under different policies. The first question to ask is
what the likelihood is of achieving the goal with no action at all. Calculating the probability of
emissions being less than or equal to 1400 GtC with no policy, we find a 24% probability that this
will meet the target.
Next we take the two idealized QELROs discussed above: AOSIS and stabilization of
emissions. The probability densities of cumulative CO2 emissions for each of the three cases—no
policy, stabilization, and AOSIS—are compared in Figure 5. Note that the probability of achieving
the goal of emitting less than 1400 GtC by 2100 is the area under each curve to the left of the
vertical line. Two results are apparent from the graph. The first is that the likelihood of limiting
emissions to less than 1400 GtC is dramatically improved by either of the emissions reduction
protocols. This experiment gives the stabilization approach a probability of achieving the target of
91%, and the probability of AOSIS meeting the same target of 95%.
The second implication is that AOSIS, while likely entailing substantially higher costs, does
not appear to exhibit a significant advantage over stabilization once uncertainty is accounted for.
This adds a perspective that is not visible in the current negotiations in which much of the current
focus is on whether the level of stabilization should be 5%, 15%, or 20% of 1990 emissions.
Whereas in a scenario-based analysis, such as that presented in Figure 4, the existence of
uncertainty appears to make AOSIS a clearly better alternative, in fact, explicit consideration of
uncertainty suggests that AOSIS offers little advantage over stabilization. The relevant comparison
between stabilization and AOSIS is not between the CO2 concentrations of 645 ppm vs. 625 ppm,
but rather between a 91% and a 95% probability of avoiding warming of more than 2˚C.
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Figure 5: Probability density functions of cumulative emissions for different policies. Area under
curves to the left of the vertical line represents the probability that global mean surface temperature
will rise by less than 2˚C by 2100.
Why does the AOSIS protocol offer little advantage under uncertainty? Recall that while the
OECD nations are constrained in the stabilization and the AOSIS protocols, other nations continue
to increase their emissions unconstrained. However, the amount of emissions by the unconstrained
nations varies greatly as a result of the uncertainties in economic growth and future technologies.
This uncertainty in the emissions of the unconstrained nations dwarfs the differences between
stabilizing at 1990 levels vs. 20% below.16 The main benefit of the stabilization and AOSIS
protocols arises from the fact that OECD emissions do not continue to grow, not from the precise
level at which emissions are stabilized.
4. How Safe is Safe Enough?
From the previous analysis, we have seen that it is not possible to conclude definitively that
one policy will achieve a long-term goal while another will not. Rather, different policy proposals
have a greater or lesser likelihood of achieving a desired level of carbon concentrations. A choice
of the amount of emissions reductions on the basis of climate impact should therefore be
considered as an explicit decision about the acceptable level of risk. But this raises the thorny
question of what level of risk is acceptable. This question has long been debated by risk-analysts
and others (see, for example, Derby and Keeney, 1981), without a clear answer emerging.
Instead, we might look to the often-cited “precautionary principle” for help. The precautionary
principle seeks to shift the burden of proof from the opponents of a given activity that could
degrade the environment to those engaged in that activity. Some governments have explicitly
endorsed the precautionary principle. For example, in the wake of the Enquete Commission on
climate change, the German Bundestag agreed to apply this principle in all issue areas (Beuermann
and Jäger, 1996).17 It also has been endorsed by numerous international conferences and
conventions on environmental issues (Bodansky, 1991). The declaration of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe’s Bergen conference on sustainable development defines the
precautionary principle: “Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation” (United Nations, 1990).
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 Note that this simple example neglects the possibility of severe non-linear impacts or “surprises.” Allowing even
a very small probability of surprise could make the difference between AOSIS and stabilization extremely
significant.
17
 Beuermann and Jäger argue that many of the actual policies pursued by the German government have not,
however, corresponded to the tenets of the precautionary principle.
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The precautionary principle has been criticized for being unrealistic and impractical as
witnessed by the ease with which governments can adopt “principles” but pursue realist policies.
Others fear that pursuing such a principle will not simply result in hypocrisy but in real economic
damages. For example, Beckerman (1995) worries that reliance on a precautionary principle will
pressure governments into “hastily devised, inefficient and expensive environmental regulatory
policies that usually involve an unwarranted intervention in the operation of the market” (p. 1).
More fundamentally, Bodansky (1991) argues that the precautionary principle is “too vague to
serve as a regulatory standard because it does not specify how much caution should be taken”
(p. 5). In the end, while it may serve a useful purpose in the political debate, the precautionary
principle gives little guidance to policy-makers as to how much caution to use.
Furthermore, the problem is actually even more difficult than deciding how much risk the
international community is willing to bear. Unlike the simple illustration in Section 3, in reality we
do not have, nor are we likely to have, probability distributions for outcomes under alternative
policies. In a problem with the dimensionality and scale of climate change, there are many different
types of uncertainty that exist. As discussed in Section 2, many of the uncertainties are in fact
indeterminacies, which, even when recognized, have probabilities that cannot be quantified. For
example, in the case of ozone-depleting CFCs, it is not that the compounds were not tested for
environmental impacts; it was their lack of toxicity along with their ideal thermodynamic properties
that led to widespread use of CFCs. At the time, all known health and safety impacts were tested,
and it is only in retrospect that we realize that testing for other impacts (depletion of stratospheric
ozone) had not even been considered (Bodansky, 1991).
When a choice must be made in the face of indeterminacies, people fill in knowledge gaps with
their values. The evidence presented here could lead an observer to distinctly different conclusions
regarding policy depending upon their initial predisposition. Probabilistic assessments can help to
identify the range of ideological positions that are implicit in many of the debates over climate
change. An individual who is particularly concerned with avoiding the costs of regulation might
feel that a 24% chance of avoiding serious impact without emissions reductions presents a strong
case to postpone any such protocol. On the other hand, someone that places far greater weight on
avoiding damages might invoke the precautionary principle to support the AOSIS protocol in order
to reduce the risk of serious impacts to 5%, or even lower.18
In the midst of this value-laden debate, both scenario and probabilistic assessments have a role
in identifying tradeoffs and in providing insights into better approaches to achieve goals once
chosen. As Greenberger and Hogan (1987) note, “the real value of modeling is in the
understanding and deepening of insights it provides, not in the numbers it produces” (p. 242). The
conclusion of Section 3, that AOSIS is only marginally more effective than stabilization once
uncertainty is accounted for, is one example of such a qualitative insight made possible by explicit
incorporation of uncertainty. Nevertheless, we must be cautious about making definitive
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 Of course there are many other views besides the extremes. A more moderate decision-maker would probably
consider the reduction of the risk of more than 2˚C warming from 76% to 9% worthwhile, but the gain of an
additional 4% risk reduction not desirable, subject to cost and damage considerations.
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recommendations based on model results. Not only can the traditional practice of scenario analysis
be misleading by neglecting the intrinsic uncertainty in climate change, but also accurate
probabilistic predictions are not feasible, nor would the problem be completely solved if they were.
We must remember that any response to climate change, as with any other political agreement, will
be determined on the basis of competing values and interests. Model-based analysis can help to
clarify implications to the various interested parties. The next section will use the tool of
probabilistic analysis to demonstrate one other issue relevant to the policy debate, that of the
probability of compliance with an agreement.
5. Implications of Failed Political Agreements
Thus far we have analyzed the effects of uncertainty in future economic and technological
trends upon the impacts of emission reduction policies assuming that the appropriate policy is
implemented exactly as designed. One other type of uncertainty that is seldom addressed in policy
analysis is the uncertainty in political commitments. Any solution to climate change will require
sustained long-term political cooperation, while in fact sustained political commitment is a rarity,
especially in the face of economic hardships that emissions constraints are likely to entail.
Most policy analyses represent a particular policy of emissions reductions either as constraints
on the emissions of carbon or as carbon taxes. In such mathematical simulations, carbon taxes are
paid in full and emissions constraints are precisely met. Furthermore, all parties to the agreement
meet their commitments. It is especially worth noting that for studies that present an optimal policy,
such a policy is only optimal if in fact all parties enact that policy. As with other uncertainties, such
recommendations may not be robust if we take account of the fundamental political uncertainty.
In reality, political agreements may fail for many reasons. One way in which parties to an
agreement may fail to meet targets is through taking inadequate measures. The effect of such
measures may be miscalculated due to precisely the same types of forecast uncertainties discussed
in Section 2. The agreement of the Annex I nations to return to 1990 emissions levels by 2000 is
an example of a commitment that will not be met by the majority of parties, as shown in Table 2. In
fact, the only Annex I region that will definitely meet the targets for 2000 are the Former Soviet
Union and Eastern European nations, not because of political commitments undertaken as part of
the FCCC, but because of the post-1989 economic collapse, an example of the type of
unanticipated external events discussed earlier.
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Table 2. Expected Performance of Annex I Regions in Returning to 1990 Levels by 2000
Country/Region 1990 Carbon Emissions 2000 Carbon Emissions Increase over 1990 Levels
United States 1,337 1,543 +15.4%
Canada 137 160 +16.8%
Western Europe 1,016 1,081 +6.4%
Japan 308 401 +30.2%
Australasia 100 114 +14.0%
Total OECD 2,985 3,421 +14.6%
Former Soviet Union 1,029 733 -28.8%
Eastern Europe 309 278 -6.8%
Total Economies in Transition 1,339 1,012 -24.4%
Total Annex I 4,324 4,433 +2.5%
  Source: Derived from Table A9, EIA (1997)
In addition to not taking sufficient measures to meet a target, it is also easy to conceive of a
nation intentionally reneging on its obligations, when the targets result in economic hardships.19 In
the face of the unknown but probably significant chance that at least one party to the FCCC may
not meet its obligations under a protocol, what are the implications for the policy chosen? More
specifically, what are the relative merits of a more stringent protocol met by most parties compared
with a less stringent protocol met by all industrialized nations?
Referring back to the many national submissions provided in Table 1, one might assume that
the most stringent proposal would have the best chance of meeting a particular climate objective.
This is surely true if all nations carry out the stated reductions but is far from certain if we allow for
non-compliance. As an illustration, we create another idealized scenario. Suppose, as in Section 3,
that the OECD nations commit to the AOSIS protocol, requiring cuts to 20% below 1990
emissions levels. But this time, because of the economic hardships that these reductions entail and
a lack of political will domestically, the U.S. does not constrain emissions despite the agreement
(i.e. the U.S. emits roughly as much carbon as in the no policy case). For simplicity, we assume
that all other OECD nations continue to implement the AOSIS protocol even after the U.S. is
clearly not reducing emissions. In reality, one nation reneging would clearly reduce the incentive
for others to keep their commitments.
The AOSIS protocol is more stringent than the alternative of stabilizing emissions at 1990
levels. How do the cumulative emissions of the AOSIS protocol, without the U.S. complying,
compare with an emissions stabilization protocol in which all parties meet the agreement? As in
Section 3, we examine the relative effects of these two policy scenarios under the same
uncertainties described above. Again using cumulative emissions for 1990–2100 of 1400 GtC as a
loose proxy for a 2˚C rise in temperature, what is the probability under each policy that the goal is
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 Australia has publicly threatened to refuse to participate in any protocol that fails to allow for differentiation of
burdens to account for impacts on Australia’s trade balance, which is highly dependent on coal exports
(McPhedran, 1996; O’Sullivan, 1997). Theoretical investigations of the implications of free-riders for climate
change agreements can be found in Nordhaus and Yang (1996) and Hoel (1994).
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met? As shown in Figure 6, the AOSIS protocol without the U.S. has significantly less chance of
meeting the long-term policy goal than the stabilization protocol. The probability of meeting the
target is only 66% for AOSIS without the U.S., as compared with 91% for stabilization with full
participation.
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Figure 6. Probability densities of cumulative emissions for no policy, stabilization with
participation from all OECD regions, and AOSIS imposed on all OECD regions except for U.S.,
which is completely unconstrained.
Although this example is highly simplified, it illustrates that the tradeoff between the stringency
of a protocol and compliance with that protocol can have dramatic implications for climate. It is,
after all, reduced climate impacts that should be the measure against which the success of any
protocol is assessed, not the maximum burden that a subset of countries is willing to bear. There is
a greater chance of reducing the impact of climate change through agreements that, even if less
stringent, are more likely to be complied with. Although this experiment may seem to overstate the
case by choosing the U.S., the largest emitter, to be in complete non-compliance, we simply
provide this example as a starting point in considering the balance between stringency and
compliance. Non-compliance or non-adherence by minor emitters would, obviously, have less
dramatic impact and could reverse the policy recommendations. It is not unreasonable, however, to
imagine that there may be several countries that only partially comply, which could combine to
have as large impact as one major emitter not complying (e.g., the failed commitments to reach
1990 levels by 2000).20 Furthermore, a failure of one party to meet commitments while other
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 This example also illustrates the importance of getting the largest CO2 emitters to agree in the first place. For
example, Skolnikoff (1997) notes that the reticence of the U.S. to agree to substantial emissions reductions has
greatly reduced prospects for agreement to a stringent protocol.
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parties face stringent restrictions, will more likely result in other nations reneging and in an overall
loss of credibility for a coordinated international effort.
Thus, gains from a more stringent protocol may well be more than offset if it increases the
chances that the agreements may not be met. The issue of political uncertainty is clearly central in
crafting an effective and robust international response and has not been given adequate attention in
the literature. The success of an agreement will be measured not only by the stringency claimed by
a protocol but also by the implementation of said protocol, measured in terms of adherence and
compliance.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has presented several simple illustrations of the ability of current policy proposals to
meet a long-term climate impact goal when uncertainties in economic growth and technology
development are made explicit. We would remind the reader that a number of caveats and areas for
further work remain:
• A probabilistic model is not the ideal framework for formulating a response to climate
change, it simply provides another set of tools that can be useful in reminding both policy
analysts and policy-makers about real-world uncertainties.
• Inter-model differences are an important source of uncertainty and different outcomes, and
so the type of exercise presented here would ideally be repeated on several models.
• Conclusions drawn from uncertainty analysis will hold only if rapid, unanticipated,
catastrophic change is not present. Since concern over a surprise is a major motivation for
addressing climate change, evaluating policies in the presence of a possible surprise should
be modeled explicitly.
• Our emphasis on the need for flexible response points to the importance of sequential
decision-making, as opposed to the simplistic once-only decision model used here and in
most other studies.
Solutions do not emerge from modeling exercises. Climate change, like most environmental
problems, is at its heart a question of how society (in this case the international community) deals
with risk and the provision of public goods. Any solution must inevitably come from the political
arena and an on-going balancing of competing interests and values. Nevertheless, we do maintain
that powerful insights, not otherwise available, are provided by explicitly analyzing uncertainty:
1. Emissions Paths Are Misleading. The concept of a global path of emissions over time is not
a helpful analytical construct because it ascribes a false concreteness to the study of the
effects of policy. While quantifying the effects of different policies is an important
contribution of modeling, deterministic answers imply a clear preference for one policy over
another in the sense that one policy is perceived as coming closer to accomplishing some
“goal.” We argue that, given underlying uncertainty, no model can predict whether actions
will be sufficient. Rather, it is preferable to ask how much more likely one policy is to
achieve some goal than another. More useful insights are likely to emerge from such an
approach.
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2. Any Response To Climate Change Must Be Flexible, not only in terms of quantitative
targets, but also in terms of the institutions and policy instruments. Although this analysis
does not explore the uncertainty in ultimate impacts and in costs of emissions reductions, the
same uncertainties that cause a wide range of possible emissions will result in large ranges
of cost and impact estimates. Since these uncertainties will not be reduced in the short-term,
policy-makers should be prepared to adapt policies for any eventuality.
3. Interpretation Can Be Ideological, Modelling Exercises Should Not Be. Relying solely on
emissions paths can draw unnecessary attention to model structure, based largely on
ideological positions, because comparing point estimates of different modeling results places
the entire debate over uncertainty at the level of inter-model differences. The integrity of
model comparison exercises could benefit from increased reliance on uncertainty analysis
within each model, thereby spanning alternative ideological positions.
4. The Current Policy Debate Over Emissions Reductions Has Relatively Minor Implications
For Climate.   If the goal is to prevent temperature from rising by more than 2˚C in 100 years
(or, more accurately, preventing cumulative emissions from exceeding 1400 GtC), then the
differences in impact between prominent current proposals are found to be minimal. It is
more important to stabilize in the industrialized world at any of the levels being considered.
5. Climate Impacts Should Inform The Tradeoff Between Stringency And Compliance. Simply
assuming that the strictest protocol will provide the best result for climate neglects the fact
that outcomes depend significantly upon adherence and compliance assumptions. If, in
order to achieve a slightly more stringent protocol, nations negotiate a protocol that is so
strict that it encourages countries to defect for a variety of political or economic reasons,
then a less stringent target that is more likely to achieve full compliance can have a better
chance of reducing the impacts of climate change.
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